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A PROBLEM OF PROCESS IN WTO
JURISPRUDENCE: IDENTIFYING DISPUTED




One stumbling block in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing1 has been the question of exactly when, how, and with what effect
disputed issues are to be identified. Must a party make its claims explicit
in its request for a panel or in its written submissions to a panel? Must it
make them in its request for consultations or in the consultations
themselves? How do such statements shape the terms of reference for a
panel? Can a party refine and revise its claims as the proceedings
evolve? At first blush, one might reasonably conclude that the DSU
answers such questions unambiguously in its provisions on Consulta-
tions (Article 4),2 the Establishment of Panels (Article 6), a and the
Terms of Reference of Panels (Article 7).4 However, an examination of
those provisions in light of some Appellate Body decisions suggests that
the jurisprudence of these and related questions is so far unsettled. In
particular, is a party bound by the claims it has made in its request for
consultations, or the consultations themselves, in the same way that it is
bound by its panel request?
5
II. WHAT THE DSU PROVISIONS PROVIDE
A. Consultations: Requests and Replies
The WTO dispute settlement process, as spelled out in the DSU,
begins when one Member makes a written request of another to enter
* Gary N. Horlick, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C. Chairman, Permanent Group
of Experts on Subsidies, World Trade Organization.
** Glenn R. Butterton, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.
1. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, in RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTmATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 1(1994), 404 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226
[hereinafter DSU].
2. Id. art. 4, at 407,33 I.L.M. at 1228.
3. Id. art. 6, at 410, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
4. Id. art. 7, at 410, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
5. Under GAIT practice, the analogous question was also much debated, though we will hold
historical discussion in abeyance here.
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consultations. According to DSU Article 4.4, that request "shall give
the reasons for the request, including identification of the measures at
issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint."
6
Any member receiving a request "undertakes to accord sympathetic
consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation
regarding any representations made by another Member concerning
measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken
within the territory of the [requesting party] .
Under ordinary circumstances, a Member receiving such a request
must reply "within 10 days" and enter into consultations within "no
more than 30 days" after receiving the request.8 These time periods are
shortened in urgent cases (for example, where perishable goods are
involved) ,9 in which case Members must enter into consultations no
more than ten days after the request is received, and a panel may be
requested when the consultations fail to settle the dispute within twenty
days.
1°
Members are obliged to enter into consultations "in good faith"'"
and "attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the matter."' 2 Further-
more, the consultations "shall be confidential, and without prejudice
to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings.'
3
B. Panels: Requests and Terms of Reference
Once the request for consultations has been made, parties may reach
the panel process in three ways. First, if a Member simply does not
respond within ten days of receiving the request, or does not enter into
consultations within thirty days, then the Member requesting consulta-
6. DSU, supra note 1, art. 4.4., at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229 (stating that the Member making the
request must also notify the Dispute Settlement Body and the relevant Councils and Committees).
7. Id. art. 4.2, at 407, 33 I.L.M. at 1228. The duty to consult is a strict one. In Desiccated Coconut,
Brazil refused to consult with the complaining party, the Philippines. In its report, the panel
asserted that "[c]ompliance with the fundamental obligation of WTO Members to enter into
consultations where a request is made under the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute
settlement system" and that the "Members' duty to consult is absolute." WTO Panel Report,
Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, 287 (Oct. 17, 1996).
8. DSU, supra note 1, art. 4.3, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1228.
9. However, it appears that both parties must agree, which seems unlikely. See United
States-Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles from Japan under Sections 301 and 304 of
the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS6/1 (May 22, 1995).
10. See DSU, supra note 1, art. 4.8, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
11. Id. art. 4.3, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1228.
12. Id. art. 4.5, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
13. Id. art. 4.6, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
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tions "may proceed directly to request the establishment of a panel.' ' 4
Second, if the consultations "fail to settle a dispute within 60 days"
after the original request for consultations is received, "the corfiplain-
ing party may request the establishment of a panel."' 5 Third, if the
parties jointly conclude that the consultations have failed to settle the
dispute, the complaining party may request establishment of a panel
even within the sixty-day period.
1 6
Like the request for consultations,1 7 the request for a panel must also
be in writing.' 8 It must indicate "whether consultations were held,"
identify "the specific measures at issue," and provide a "brief summary
of the legal basis of the complaint" that is "sufficient to present the
problem clearly."' 19 If the Member requesting a panel wishes, a panel
will be established after a successful request at the meeting of the
Dispute Settlement Board (DSB), immediately following the meeting
at which the request initially appears as an agenda item.2 °
Unless the parties to a dispute agree otherwise within twenty days of
the establishment of a panel, the terms of reference of the panel shall
be:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of
the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute),
the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document
... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
that/those agreement(s).21
If the Member requesting a panel wishes non-standard terms of
reference, the panel request "shall include the proposed text of special
terms of reference. "22 Moreover, in establishing a panel "the DSB may
authorize its Chairman to draw up the terms of reference of the panel
in consultation with the parties to the dispute."
2
1
14. Id. art. 4.3, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1228.
15. Id. art. 4.7, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
16. See id.
17. See id. art. 4.4, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
18. See id. art. 6.2, at 410, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
19. Id.
20. See id. art. 6.1, at 410, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
21. Id. art. 7.1, at 410-11, 33 I.L.M. at 1230-31.
22. Id. art. 6.2, at 410, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
23. Id. art. 7.3, at 411, 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
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III. DSU PRACTICE
Within the framework of Articles 4, 6, and 7, DSU jurisprudence has
listed some important constraints as to when, how, and with what effect
disputed issues are to be identified. Put one way, the rub lies in the
difference between Article 4.4, which spells out the legal requirements
for making a request for consultations, and Article 6.2, which does the
same for panel requests. The key question is perhaps how these two sets
of requirements bind the future conduct of the complaining parties.
A. How Claims Determine Terms of Reference
The Appellate Body has limited the "matter" that is the proper
subject of a panel's attention to the claims expressed by a complaining
party in the terms of reference. In Desiccated Coconut, for example, the
Appellate Body asserts that:
[T]he "matter" referred to a panel for consideration consists
of the specific claims stated by the parties to the dispute in the
relevant documents specified in the terms of reference. We
agree with the approach taken in previous adopted panel
reports that a matter, which includes the claims composing that
matter, does not fall within a panel's terms of reference unless
the claims are identified in the documents referred to or
contained in the terms of reference.24
This intuitively appealing proposition is supported by a predictable
argument of fairness. "[T]erms of reference," writes the Appellate
Body, "fulfill an important due process objective-they give the parties
and third parties sufficient information concerning the claims at issue
in the dispute in order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the
complainant's case."-
25
Subsequently, this view was elaborated upon in three important ways
in EC-Bananas.26 First, while anchoring the claims expressed in the
terms of reference firmly in the request for a panel, the Appellate Body
distinguished the requirement that claims be stated in the panel
24. WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measuring Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22/AB/R, at 21 (Feb. 21, 1997).
25. Id.
26. SeeWTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 142-46 (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter
EC-Bananas].
[Vol. 31
A PROBLEM OF PROCESS IN WTO JURISPRUDENCE
request from the fact that a complainant will subsequently make
arguments in support of its claims-developing and clarifying them-in
various written submissions:
In our view, there is a significant difference between the claims
identified in the request for the establishment of a panel, which
establish the panel's terms of reference under Article 7 of the
DSU, and the arguments supporting those claims, which are set
out and progressively clarified in the first written submissions,
the rebuttal submissions and the first and second Panel meet-
ings with the parties. 7
Second, EC-Bananas presented the fairness argument of Desiccated
Coconut (which focused on the terms of reference) in terms of the
panel request.
[I] t is incumbent upon a panel to examine the request for the
establishment of the panel very carefully to ensure its compli-
ance with both the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU.
It is important that a panel request be sufficiently precise for
two reasons: first, it often forms the basis for the terms of
reference of the panel pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU; and,
second, it informs the defending party and the third parties of
the legal basis of the complaint.
28
Third, EC-Bananas stated flatly that partially expressed or otherwise
defective claims could not, once they had been presented in a panel
request, be amended or rehabilitated in arguments offered in later
written submissions. The EC-Bananas panel stated, "[i] f a claim is not
specified in the request for establishment of a panel, then a faulty
request cannot be subsequently 'cured' by a complaining party's argu-
mentation in its first written submission to the panel or in any other
submission or statement made later in the panel proceeding.
'" 29
27. Id, 141. In Cement, the focus on the panel request as the essential vehicle for the
expression of claims was reinforced as well. According to the Appellate Body, Article 6.2 of the
DSU requires that both "the 'measure at issue' and the 'legal basis of the complaint' (or the
'claims') be identified in a request for the establishment of a panel." WTO Appellate Body
Report, Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico,
WT/DS60/AB/R, 69 (Nov. 2, 1998).
28. EC-Bananas, supra note 26, 1 142.
29. Id. 143.
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B. The Comeuppance and the Pettifogger3°
Given the details of Articles 4, 6, and 7, and the jurisprudence of
Desiccated Coconut and EC-Bananas, few would be surprised to find less
than generous treatment for any party attempting to fudge the require-
ment that a complainant's claims be stated fully in the panel request.
This impulse to correct the misconduct of pettifoggers is part of the
general desire to ensure fair treatment for defending and third parties
by putting them on notice as to the terms of reference in a given
proceeding. A complainant received its comeuppance on this score in
Salmon:
[The] request for the establishment of a panel did not include a
claim of violation of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel's
terms of reference are determined by [the] request for the
establishment of a panel. We, therefore, agree with Australia
that Article 6 of the SPS Agreement is not within the terms of
reference of the Panel.3 '
Likewise, another Member came up short in India-Patent.32 After
noting that "a claim must be included in the request for the establish-
ment of a panel to come within a panel's terms of reference," the
Appellate Body focused on the language of the request, which con-
tended that "India's legal regime appears to be inconsistent with the
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement, including but not necessarily
limited to, Articles 27, 65 and 70."33 The Appellate Body roundly
condemned the notion that such language could be used to introduce
subsequent claims:
With respect to Article 63 [of the TRIPS Agreement], the
convenient phrase "including but not necessarily limited to", is
30. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a "pettifogger" as a "rascally attorney" who
"employs mean, sharp, cavilling practices," a "legal practitioner of inferior status." The prefix
"petti-" is derived from "petty" meaning "little-minded," while the noun "fogger" is of somewhat
obscure origin though generally believed to be derived from the surname of a renowned family of
merchants and financiers (namely, "Fugger") of Augsburg in the 15th and 16th centuries.
OXFORIYENGLISH DIcTIoNARyV:1131, XI:643 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 2d ed. 1989).
31. WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/AB/R, 110 (Oct. 20, 1998).
32. See WTO Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
33. Id. 89.
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simply not adequate to "identify the specific measures at issue
and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint
sufficient to present the problem clearly" as required by Article
6.2 of the DSU. If this phrase incorporates Article 63, what
Article of the TRIPS Agreement does it not incorporate? There-
fore, this phrase is not sufficient to bring a claim relating to
Article 63 within the terms of reference of the Panel. 4
The Appellate Body's desire to impose a hard procedural constraint
by narrowly interpreting the requirements of Article 6.2 is not surpris-
ing; rudimentary considerations of due process will seem to most
lawyers, not to mention diplomats, to demand as much. It would be
surprising, however, to find the same kind of hard constraint applied to
consultations. That is, many would not expect, and not want the
Appellate Body to require, parties involved only in the consultation
phase of WTO dispute resolution to be required to state all of their
claims fully-in the consultation request and the consultations them-
selves-and to be foreclosed from raising additional claims subse-
quently. Yet, in India-Patent, the Appellate Body, making use of the
same due process rationale stressed in Desiccated Coconut and EC-
Bananas, opined in dicta that:
All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully
forthcoming from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in a
dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must be
stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in
consultations as well as in the more formal setting of panel proceedings.
In fact, the demands of due process that are implicit in the DSU make
this especially necessary during consultations. For the claims that are
made and the facts that are established during consultations do
much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent
panel proceedings. If, in the aftermath of consultations, any
party believes that all the pertinent facts relating to a claim are,
for any reason, not before the panel, then that party should ask
the panel in that case to engage in additional fact-finding. But
this additional fact-finding cannot alter the claims that are
before the panel because it cannot alter the panel's terms of
reference.35
34. Id. 90.
35. Id. 94 (emphasis added). Witness, too, Mr. Parlin's observation thatJapan has proposed
a requirement that all legal claims cited in a panel request must have been raised during the
2000]
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These propositions would reflect an ideal degree of disclosure by the
parties, but they seem at odds With the spirit, if not the letter, of the
WTO dispute resolution process. They are also impractical. The consul-
tation portion of the process, along with conciliation, mediation, and
good offices, is designed to enable parties to reach settlements of their
disputes without reaching the panel stage. Although the panel and
appellate processes are heavily formalized, the consultation process is
comparatively informal and aims at allowing parties to gather informa-
tion and, if possible, "jawbone" their way to a solution while avoiding
the costs and demands of panels.36
Certain attributes of the DSU process vividly demonstrate that it is
crafted to facilitate pre-panel resolutions. For example, while consulta-
tion requests must state "the reasons for the request, including identifi-
cation of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for
the complaint,", 37 there is no panel-style record of the consultations
which might figure into later proceedings. In fact, there is, by design,
no record whatever: as an authoritative source has indicated, typically,
the consultations last "no longer than two or three hours, '' 39 are
"generally conducted in English with no interpreters, no transcript,
and no taping" 40 and are closed to the public and other WTO
Members.41 Moreover, quite apart from the lack of a record, the
content of all consultations is "confidential, '42 and all consultations
are undertaken "without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any
consultations. See Christopher Parlin, Operation of Consultations, Deterrence and Mediation, 31 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 571 (2000).
36. It also allows the parties a greater measure of control in shaping the outcome of their
dispute. Presumably, the drafters of the DSU had this in mind when making the observation in
Article 3.7 that "[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with
the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred." DSU, supra note 1, art. 3.7, at 406, 33 I.L.M. at
1227.
37. Id. art. 4.4, at 408, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
.38. See William J. Davey & Amelia Porges, Comment, Performance of the System I: Consultations
&Deterrence, 32 INT'L LAw. 695, 705 (1998).
39. Id. at 704.
40. Id.
41. There is an exception for Members with a "substantial trade interest" who may officially
participate under Article 4.11, though this has been a somewhat vexed provision in its own right.
For one thing, the respondent exclusively decides if another Member may join the consultations,
and, of course, this has led to protests over the fact that a respondent may freely select Members
who side with its view. A related but undecided question is whether a Member who joins on the
basis of Article 4.11 should be able to bypass the consultations process and go directly to a panel
itself. SeeDSU, supra note 1, art. 4.11, at 409, 33 I.L.M. at 1229.
42. Id. art. 4.6, at 408, 33 1.L.M. at 1229.
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further proceedings."
43
At a minimum, these provisions wisely suppose that the parties will
not necessarily know all the claims they will want to make or not make
at this relatively early stage. In this connection, the DSU provisions can
create an atmosphere in which discussions can evolve and parties can
speak and explore ideas freely and in private; in short, an "open"
atmosphere conducive to settlement. On the other hand, the dicta of
India-Patent, in effect, treat each party as a pettifogger and, at the end
of the day, may only succeed in motivating all parties to be "guarded"
rather than "open." Although, as Professor Davey has noted, "totally
ignoring how the consultations are conducted could significantly under-
mine their role,"" any rule by which parties are held to account for all
they have said or not said in consultations, will likely have a chilling
effect on the consultation process. Some parties may stonewall alto-
gether (as some do now), for fear of the longer term adverse panel and
appellate consequences of saying anything at all, though they run the
risk of having a complaining party seek very broad terms of reference
in its panel request.45 Others, ironically, will see consultations as an
opportunity for discovery and will take advantage of Members who
naively speak freely in the belief that what they say is completely off the
record.46 The Appellate Body, in recent cases, has shown a sophisti-
cated understanding of the strategies being pursued in consultations;
these decisions suggest that the focus has moved from what was
discussed in the consultations to what was said in the panel request.
47
As Mr. Parlin's statistical taxonomy of the DSU results over the past
five years shows, forty-one of the seventy-eight complaints (or fifty-three
percent) resolved to date have been resolved without resort to a panel,
43. Id.
44. Davey & Porges, supra note 38, at 697.
45. See Question and Answer Summary, Performance of the System I: Consultations & Deterrence, 32
INT'L LAw. 695, 706 (1998) (summarizing a statement by Gary Horlick).
46. See Hyun Chong Kim, The WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A Primer, 2J. INT'L EcoN. L. 457,
462 (1999). For example, Mr. Kim reports that "Korea's experience has been that some
complainants treat consultations as a discovery stage such as it exists under US civil procedure"
and that "[i]n the DSU Review, a Member stated that the consultation stage is used as a 'mere
procedural phase in panel processes'." Id.
47. See WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products, Wr/DS98/AB/R, 124-31, 139 (Dec. 14, 1999); See WTO Appellate Body
Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft WI/DS46/AB/R, 1 29, 126-33 (Aug. 2,
1999); See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, 1 70 (june 5, 1998);
See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 155-56 (Jan. 16, 1998).
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of which "thirty complaints have been resolved by bilateral settlements,
three by withdrawal of the contested measure, and seven by withdrawal
of the request for establishment of a panel or other provable abandon-
ment.
' 48
These numbers are encouraging. They also demonstrate that the
DSU system-to the extent that it seeks to facilitate pre-panel settle-
ments-is enjoying considerable success. Arguably, that success has
been due in part to the separation between the consultation phase and
the panel process, as well as the low-cost and potentially great benefits
of participation in the consultation phase. However, if the hard con-
straints on consultations suggested by India-Patent were applied, that
separation would be sharply reduced, effecting a virtual merger of the
consultation and panel processes. In the worst case, the settlement rate
would decline significantly as a result.
48. Parlin, supra note 35, at 568.
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